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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent. : 
vs. : 
CHARLES LANGDON, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 880370-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant pled no contest to a charge of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3 (1987) because the charge is a second 
degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant is precluded from appealing the 
denial of his motion to suppress when he subsequently entered an 
unconditional plea of no contest to the charge. 
2. Whether defendant has standing to challenge the 
search of the box attached to the car which he was driving and 
the seizure of the cocaine found in the box. 
3. Whether the troopers had probable cause to search 
the box attached to the car thus making the search lawful. 
4. Whether the troopers' detention of defendant was 
for a reasonable length of time. 
5. Whether the troopers' reliance on a judge's oral 
authorization to search the box was a good faith reliance under 
U.S. v. Leon. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following statutory provision: 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-4 (1982). 
The text of this provision is attached in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(iv) (Supp. 1988), alleged to have occurred on March 17, 
1988. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on April 
6, 1988# with the Fifth Judicial District Court for Iron County. 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves heard evidence and argument on the 
matter on May 2, 1988, and May 17, 1988. Based on the evidence 
and Memoranda of Law submitted by plaintiff and defendant. Judge 
Eves denied the motion in an order signed May 31, 1988. A copy 
of the Order had been sent to counsel on May 23, 1988. (A copy 
of this Order is included in the Addendum.) 
Trial in the matter had been set for June 3, 1988. On 
June 1, 1988, defendant moved to continue trial pending an 
interlocutory appeal but the trial court denied the motion. 
Defendant discussed the matter with his counsel and changed his 
plea to one of no contest. Defendant signed a Statement of 
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain on that date. (Copies of the 
Minute Entry and Defendant's Statement are included in the 
Addendum.) 
On June 1, 1988, defendant was sentenced to a term of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and no fine. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 17, 1988, at approximately 6:30 p.m., three 
Utah Highway Patrolmen were travelling northbound on 1-15 near 
Cedar City, Utah (R. 180 at 4, R. 181 at 14 and 30). The trooper 
who was driving noticed two cars behind him which appeared to be 
speeding. He pulled over and turned on his rear radar to check 
their speed (R. 180 at 4). The second car, driven by defendant, 
was clocked at 70 miles per hour and the troopers pulled it over 
for speeding (R. 180 at 5). 
Trooper Lee approached defendant, who was the sole 
occupant of the 1978 Cadillac, and asked for his driver's license 
and registration (R. 180 at 5). The registration did not list 
defendant's name as owner of the car but instead gave the names 
of Marvin (last name not in record) and Anthony Linear (R. 180 at 
5, R. 181 at 17 and 31). The trooper became suspicious when the 
car was registered to others and began to investigate (R. 180 at 
5, R. 181 at 17). 
Defendant told the troopers that the car belonged to 
his stepson (T. 180 at 6). Defendant then told them that he was 
buying the car but that it was registered to his stepsons for 
insurance purposes (T. 181 at 18-19 and 29). Defendant said he 
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had been buying the car for one-and-a-half years but had been in 
possession of it this time for only a day or two (T. 181 at 19). 
Defendant gave troopers a phone number in California to verify 
permission for him to have the car but, when dispatch called, 
there was no answer (R. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 21). 
Defendant gave the officers a second number to call to 
contact a woman named Fannie. Dispatch called that number and a 
woman named Sherry, who did not know defendant but knew Anthony, 
answered. She refused to give a phone number for Anthony but 
offered to give him a message (R. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 21). 
About 7:15 p.m. a man claiming to be Anthony Linnear 
telephoned and said defendant had permission to use the car. The 
person calling was not able to say where defendant was travelling 
but did say defendant had permission to drive the car (T. 180 at 
6, T. 181 at 22 and 31). 
During the time spent checking on the ownership of the 
car, Trooper Lee asked defendant if he could look through the 
car. Trooper Lee asked defendant if he had any weapons or 
contraband and defendant said no (T. 180 at 6, R. 181 at 14). 
Defendant's response when asked if the Trooper could look in the 
car was, MI don't care. Go ahead" (R. 181 at 14). Defendant 
even took the car keys out of the ignition and went to the back 
of the car and opened the trunk. Defendant then went and sat in 
the patrol car with Trooper Bagley to keep warm (R. 180 at 7, R. 
181 at 14-15). 
In searching the car. Trooper Lee found a road atlas, 
sleeping gear in the back seat, two small pieces of luggage in 
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the trunk and ammunition for a .308 automatic pistol (R. 181 at 
26). He also found air freshners, two in the trunk and one in 
the passenger compartment (R. 181 at 26). These air freshners 
were not typical hanging car freshners but were for household 
use. One was a stick-on type for fixing to a wall and one a 
liquid in a bottle (R. 181 at 35-36). 
At about 7:00 p.m., before the purported owner of the 
car was located, Trooper Lee looked under the rear of the car and 
saw a black box (R. 180 at 8, R. 181 at 33). The box was three 
to five inches by three to five inches by twelve inches and was 
welded to the underneath of the car between the gas tank and the 
rear bumper (R. 180 at 8-9, R. 181 at 15 and 23). The box had a 
new padlock on it and was free of road dirt and grime and 
appeared to be newly installed (R. 180 at 8 R. 181 at 15). The 
trooper could see that there was something in the box but not 
what it was (R. 181 at 20-21). When he found the box, the 
Trooper asked defendant if he could open the box. Defendant 
responded that he knew nothing about the box, that he did not 
want to give permission, and that he did not have a key for the 
padlock (R. 180 at 7, R. 181 at 19-20 and 38). The officers 
asked for defendant's key ring to see if any keys fit and 
defendant voluntarily handed them over. One key fit the padlock 
on the box but would not turn and open the lock (R. 181 at 20). 
Later, after the lock was opened by other means, the troopers 
found a key in the bottom of the car's glove box which fit the 
padlock (R. 181 at 48). Because defendant disclaimed any 
knowledge of or ownership in the box, the troopers had the 
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dispatcher ask the purported owner when he telephoned if they 
could open the box. The person claiming to be Anthony Linnear 
said he didn't know that a black box as welded to the bottom of 
the car, he didn't know anything about it and would not give 
permission to open the box (R. 181 at 22). 
The troopers at that point felt that they had probable 
cause to seek a warrant to open the black box. This was based on 
the following facts: 
1. The black box apparently newly welded to the 
underside of the car (R. 181 at 23). 
2. Something was in the box but officers could not see 
what (R. 181 at 20-21). 
3. Experience with hidden compartments in cars used to 
transport contraband (R. 181 at 24). 
4. The new lock on the box and the road atlas and 
paucity of personal items in the car (R. 181 at 24). 
5. The newly painted condition of the car and the new, 
expensive tires on the car (R. 181 at 25). 
6. Sleep gear and fast food wrappers in the back of 
the car (R. 181 at 25-26). 
7. Air freshners in the car which are often used to 
mask the smell of marijuana and the ether used in manufacturing 
cocaine (R. 181 at 26). 
8. The driver not owning the car and the ammunition 
found in the car (R. 181 at 27). 
The troopers then spent some time trying to find a 
member of the Iron County Attorney's Office and a judge to try to 
get a search warrant (R. 187 at 41-45). In an attempt to comply 
with Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-4 (1982), Trooper Bagley was placed 
under oath and testified to the occurrences of the evening to 
Judge Margaret Miller, the Cedar City Precinct Justice of the 
Peace. Judge Miller verbally granted authorization to search the 
box but evidently a search warrant was never actually written or 
signed (R. 180 at 10, R. 181 at 12). The search for the car's 
owner and for a judge to issue a warrant took approximately two 
hours and ten minutes (R. 181 at 39). The information used to 
seek the warrant was transcribed and introduced at the 
suppression hearing (R. 180, R. 181 at 51). 
Based on the probable cause adduced, the troopers 
picked the lock on the box and found seven ounces of 90% pure 
cocaine (R. 181 at 47 and 42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant has entered an unconditional plea of no 
contest in this case and is thus precluded from raising the 
suppression matter on appeal. 
Because defendant's claim of ownership in the car is 
nebulous and because of his disclaimer of ownership in the box 
welded to the car, he does not have standing to challenge the 
search of the box. 
All of the factors enumerated by the officers, added to 
their experience and training, gave them probable cause to 
believe that the box contained contraband and made their search 
valid. 
-7-
Under the circumstances the troopers detention of 
defendant was reasonable. A rigid time limit for detention has 
been rejected by the courts and this Court must look at the 
reasons for the detention to determine reasonableness. 
The trial court held that there was not a valid search 
warrant in this matter. In spite of that, respondent contends 
that the troopers relied, in good faith, on the verbal 
authorization as a neutral magistrate to conduct the search of 
the box. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CANNOT APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AFTER HE HAS ENTERED AN 
UNCONDITIONAL PLEA OF NO CONTEST TO THE 
CHARGE. 
Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine found in the 
black box which was attached to the underside of the car which he 
was driving. When his motion was denied, defendant appeared 
before the trial court two days before the trial and asked for a 
continuance to file an interlocutory appeal. After a brief 
recess, defendant returned and entered a no contest plea to the 
original charge (R. 169-170). (See Addendum for Minute Entry 
about the plea.) Defendant also initialed and signed a Statement 
by defendant Regarding Plea Bargain and his counsel and the 
Deputy Iron County Attorney signed certificates indicating the 
accuracy of the defendant's statement (R. 146-152) (See Addendum 
for the full text of this Statement). Paragraph 5 of the 
statement indicates that defendant knew that he had the 
Constitutional right to appeal his conviction if he were to be 
_Q_ 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the court. Nothing in the 
record gives any indication that the No Contest p] ea entered by 
defendant on May 1, 1988 was a conditional plea. The court's 
minute entry and the defendant's statement make no mention of a 
conditional plea. From the rurord it i iL> apparent thai 
defendant's plea was entered unconditionally. 
This Court recently addressed the issue of conditional 
versus unconditional pleas i i :i the case of State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court reiterated the common law 
rule that a voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant's right to 
appeal an adverse suppressioi i i: uling. Ki. at 938. The Court 
then said: 
In Utah, this general rule regarding 
forfeiture of appellate review of an adverse 
ruling on a pre-plea motion to suppress 
applies with equal force to a defendant who 
enters an unconditional no contest plea, 
which "if accepted by the court shall have 
the same effect as a plea of guilty...." 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-13-2(3) (1982). Accord 
Cookery v. State, 524 P.2d 1252 (Alaska 
1974); Jackson v. State, 294 So.2d 114 (Fla. 
App. 1974); People v. New, supra. 
Id at 938. In the Sery case this Court reversed and remanded 
because it found that Sery had entered his plea conditioned on 
the right to appeal the pre-plea suppression. The agreement in 
that case between defendant and the prosecution and approved by 
the judge allowed the appeal and a withdrawal of defendant's plea 
if the appellate court reversed the trial court's suppression 
ruling. 
In the present case, there was no such agreement in the 
record All of the information in the record points to an 
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unconditional plea on defendant's part. He is thus precluded 
from appealing the suppression ruling. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THE BOX AND THE 
SEIZURE OF THE COCAINE. 
The car which defendant was driving was registered to 
other people but defendant claimed he was buying it. Someone who 
claimed to be the owner of the car told the troopers that 
defendant had permission to drive the car. Defendant gave 
permission to search the car but no evidence requiring 
suppression was seized from the interior of the car or trunk. 
However, when Trooper Lee knelt and looked under the car (a place 
he lawfully had the right to be), he saw, in plain view, a 
rectangular box newly welded to the car's underside. When asked, 
defendant disclaimed any knowledge of the box. The purported 
owner of the car also disclaimed any knowledge of the box. 
The issue of standing was just briefly mentioned at the 
suppression hearing. The Deputy Iron County Attorney said the 
State was not prepared to concede that defendant had standing (R. 
181 at 10-11) and briefly argued the issue of standing at the 
close of evidence (R. 181 at 58-59). Defense counsel also 
briefly argued the matter (R. 181 at 60) but neither counsel 
cited any authority for their positions. The trial court made a 
cursory ruling that defendant had standing because he was the 
driver (R. 181 at 63) but focused his questions on the good faith 
exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1983) and the 
automobile exception to search warrants under Chambers v. 
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Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1969). The State maintains that the trial 
court# admittedly oi I the basis ot no case-law assistance from 
counsel, erroneously found that defendant had standing. 
Respondent contends that an individual has standing to 
object to the lawful nee. s of a search only i. f he has a ""legitimate 
expectation of privacy" in the item or premises searched. Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) A person who is aggrieved by 
diri il legal seai i:h and sej zur e oi ily through the introduction of 
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's 
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment 
rights InfrInged, ' Rakas, 4 3 9 U S, at 134, citing Anderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). The fact that the 
defendant may have been "legitimately on [the] premi ses" in that 
he may have been in the car wi th the owner's permission does not 
determine whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the particular areas of the automobi ] e searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 148. Further, Hthe proponent of a motion to suppress has the 
burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by the challenged search oi fion/ure." Rakas 439 U.S. 
131 n. 1 
The present case is similar t<> the recent case of State 
v. DeAlQi V 46 P.?<1 ll>4 (lit Ah t"i App Pi • In that case, a 
California man was driving a car registered to another man in New 
York. The driver gave consent to search the car and the officer 
found a seer et compar tmei it :1 n 1 h e t;,i ui lk which held cocaine. The 
defendant in that case denied knowledge of the compartment and 
its contents and presented no evidence at the suppression hearing 
of hiB permi BBion to ho ve the car. 
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This Court addressed the issue of that defendant's 
standing and ruled that he had no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area searched. Id. at 196-197. This Court quoted 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) as saying: 
"[djefendant concede[d] that he did not own the car or the 
attache case [found in the trunk] containing the evidence 
complained of# and [therefore] failed to show that he had any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched." Id. 
at 196. In DeAlo, as in the present case, 
defendant denied any ownership in the car and 
any knowledge of the secret compartment or 
its illegal contents. The only substantive 
evidence defendants presented at the 
suppression hearing was the testimony of the 
arresting officer that it was his 
understanding Rafael Villa was using the car 
with his brother's permission. No other 
witnesses were called and no other evidence 
was presented. It might be argued the 
officer's testimony established some 
expectation of privacy on the part of Villa. 
That certainly does not establish an 
expectation of privacy on the part of 
defendant. 
Id. at 196. This Court held that the defendant may have had an 
expectation of privacy in his own personal belongings in the car 
but not in the car itself. The defendant had not shown "a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area where the cocaine 
was found. Therefore, he had no standing to object to the 
search....- Iji. at 197. 
Since in the present case defendant denied any 
knowledge of the black box welded to the underside of the car and 
did not produce any evidence at the suppression hearing of an 
ownership interest in the car, he has not demonstrated that he 
-i o_ 
had standing to challenge the seizure of the cocaine. A 
disciaimei ,1B treated as an abandonment of the proiperty • See 
United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1434, 71 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); 
United States v. Miller, 589 F./d 1117 \1st Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); 
United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Abandoned property loses it.ft privacy expectation. State v. 
Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978). 
POINT III 
THE TROOPERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THAT THE BOX CONTAINED CONTRABAND AND THEIR 
SEARCH WAS LAWFUL. 
Defendant gave the troopers permission to search the 
car that he was driving but tried to withdraw consent when the 
troopers found the black box welded to the underside of the car. 
Defendant now claims that the troopers had n*. right to search the 
box. 
The law is quite settled that automobiles do not have 
the same protection from sear cl i tl lat houses do. See Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). This is based on the 
mobility of the car, the fact that the people in possession of 
the car aie alerted to the officers' interer* vii t h * > Irict that 
the contents of the car may never be found ; : ime is expended in 
getting a warrant. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) 
ai .< :l State v. Limb# 581 P. 2d 142 (Utah ] 978) If ai i officer has 
probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband 
the automobile may be searched without a warrant. Carroll v. 
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United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In addition, if the officers 
have probable cause to search the car the probable cause extends 
to a search at the station house when the car is taken there. 
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1969), and Texas v. White, 
423 U.S. 67 (1975). In the White case consent to search was 
denied but officers searched anyway and the Court ruled that they 
had probable cause to do so. The Court held that the officers 
had probable cause to search at the stop and the probable cause 
still existed at the station house. 3^ d. at 68. 
The troopers in the present case had probable cause to 
search the black box. The initial stop for speeding was valid 
and the defendant's consent to search the car was freely given. 
In the car, the troopers found a road atlas, sleeping gear, very 
little personal luggage (inconsistent with a trip across the 
country to a new job), three air freshners of the household- not 
car-type, and ammunition for automatic pistol but no gun. The 
car was not registered to defendant and defendant gave 
conflicting stories about what, if any, ownership interest he 
had. 
As part of his search the trooper knelt and looked 
under the car and found a rectangular black box newly welded to 
the underside and newly painted with a new padlock on it. He 
could see something in the box but not what it was. He asked 
defendant and the purported owner of the car about the box and 
both disclaimed any knowledge of it but refused to give consent 
to open it. 
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The trooper's experience and training had taught him 
tha t: el r'uq smugg lers oi ten car i :i ed contraband i n o„l der cars which 
were well cared for and had new tires. Smugglers also often hid 
the drugs in secret compartments and used household air freshner 
to try to mask the odoi ol the contraband. They travelled with 
little luggage and with sleeping gear and ate at fast food 
restaurants in order not to stay in one place too long. The 
presence of ammunition suggested the presence of a gun which may 
have been hidden in the car. 
The factors establishing probable cause to search in 
this case are: 
1 The troopers' experience and training in detecting 
drug smugglers. 
2, A few personal belongings in the car. 
3. The questions surrounding registration and 
own e r s h i p of the c ar. 
4 The ammunition in the car. 
5. The air freshners in the car. 
6 The new black box concealed under the car and its 
new padlock. 
7, The disclaimer of knowledge of the box by defendant 
and the car 's pur poi ted ownex ai id their refusal to allow a search 
of the box., 
8 The fact of something being in the box. 
These fart on* add up to probable cause to believe that 
the black box contained contraband and validated a warrantless 
search of the box. No other legitimate explanati oi i for t he 
presence, of all these* factors exists. 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION BY THE TROOPERS WAS FOR 
A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Defendant maintains that his detention for more than 
two hours before arrest was unreasonable. In United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1982), the United States Supreme Court 
declined "to adopt any outside time limitation for a permissible 
Terry stop....1' I^ i. at 709. In a footnote the Court said, "Such 
a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow 
authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any 
particular situation." ^d. at 709, f.n. 10 . 
In the present case the troopers issued a citation for 
speeding and then were seeking to verify whether defendant had 
legal use of the car. During this attempt to verify, which took 
30-45 minutes, they developed probable cause to believe that 
there was contraband in the box attached to the car. Although 
the officers at that point could have searched the box and 
arrested defendant, they chose to seek a search warrant. Their 
efforts to find a prosecutor and a judge were pursued with all 
due diligence. Evidently, most of the judges were out of the 
county and finding Judge Miller took some time (R. 181 at 44-45). 
The troopers were not dilatory in trying to obtain a warrant, nor 
did they use the time to continue searching the car or to "shake 
down" the defendant. The length of time used was reasonable in 
light of what the troopers found, defendant's refusal to consent 
to searching the box, and the attempts to find a prosecutor and a 
judge to try to obtain a warrant. 
_1 C_ 
POINT V 
THE TROOPERS RELIED ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF A 
MAGISTRATE TO CONDUCT THEIR SEARCH AND THUS 
THEIR CONDUCT ARGUABLY FALLS WITHIN THE GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION OF LEON, 
Even though the troopers in this case had probable 
cause to search the black box without a warrant, they did seek to 
obtain oni1 linn1 noopeiK souqht OUT « prosecutor and a judge in 
order to attempt to obtain a warrant. Trooper Bagley gave 
information to Judge Margaret Miller orally, with the assistance 
of a Deputy Iroi i Coin ity Attorney, to support issuance of a 
warrant, This oral affidavit was transcribed and included in the 
record (R. 180). After hearing the oral affidavit of the 
trooper, Judge Mi J lei' gave verbal authorization for the troopers 
to "continue with the search" (R. 180 at. 10). The validity of 
the authorization was challenged by defendant, at the suppression 
hearing (T 181 at 5-4). It became clear at that time that no 
written memorialization of the verbal authorization was ever made 
(T. 181 at 5). Counsel argued whether n seair-fi warrant had to be 
a written order or i f a verbal order was sufficient (T. 181 at 5-
10). The trial court held that there was no search warrant in 
this case (R. 181 at 12 and 62) The tiial court asked for 
memoranda on the application of the Hgoc >d faith exception" found 
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1983). After reviewing 
the memoranda the cou11 f oand 1.11a i 1 in> t r oope r s ha«< probable 
cause to search the black box so it did not address the Leon 
issue (R. 18 1 at 041-046, See Addendum for a copy of that 
decision). 
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Even though the trial court did not rule in 
respondent's favor on the Leon issue but instead found that the 
officers had probable cause for a warrantless search, defendant 
has brought the matter up on appeal. Respondent maintains that, 
arguably, the Leon doctrine could apply in this case. 
This case is distinguishable from State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). In the Mendoza case the officers made a 
Terry stop without reasonable suspicion according to the Utah 
Supreme Court. The officers never tried to get a search warrant 
but merely placed Mendoza under arrest then searched the car 
incident to that arrest. Since there was no reasonable suspicion 
to stop the car under Terry, the actions of the officer in the 
subsequent search were per se unreasonable. The Court did 
discuss the Leon rationale saying: 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), however, 
the Court created an exception to blanket 
application of the exclusionary rule. The 
Court held that the rule does not apply where 
the state establishes that an officer 
exhibited "objectively reasonable" reliance 
on a magistrate's probable cause 
determination and on the technical 
sufficiency of the search warrant issued. 
Id. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21. 
748 P.2d at 185. They held that the Leon exception could not be 
used in the Mendoza case saying: 
[N]o outside authority on which the officers 
could reasonably rely expressly authorized 
the search of the vehicle; therefore, the 
policy foundations of the Leon exception do 
not appear in searches of the kind involved 
in this case. 
Id. at 185 (footnote omitted). 
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In the present case the argument can be made that the 
troopei B dliiJ Bft'k an "outsule author i t.y whn expressly authorized 
the search of the box. The question arises as to whether their 
reliance was -objectively reasonable" but no finding on that 
issue was made bv the trial court be hw. Since the trial court 
held that the search was warrantless but valid because based on 
probable cause, the issue of good faith under Leon is not 
paramount in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and matters addressed at oral 
arguments, respondent requests that defendant's no contest plea 
be affirmed. 
. 4 
DATED this P~\- day of fW-flx , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
V v U " ? r*"r).-/cy. 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
J 
I hezeby certify that on the J?\_ - : ctober, 1988, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to James L. 
Shumate, 1 I U Ninth Mam, Suite H, IM Bnx 6<M, Cedar City, Utah 
84720. I 
Kr i- £L 
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ADDENDUM 
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses — Witness not 
la physical presence of magistrate — Duplicate original warrants — 
Return. (1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the issuance 
of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either reduced to writing 
or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the recorded testimony need not 
precede the issuance of the warrant Any person having standing to contest 
the search may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the 
recorded testimony in support of the application for the warrant 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence 
of an affidavit a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony 
of a person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided 
the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of 
the warrant. The sworn orsl testimony msy be communicated to the magis-
trate by telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and 
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the 
magistrate and filed with the court. This statement shall be deemed to be 
an affidavit for purposes of this section. 
(s) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursu-
ant to subsection (2) shsll be those required by this chapter. Prior to issu-
ance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the law enforcement 
officer or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read 
to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct 
that specific modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the 
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting 
attorney for the government who is requesting the warrant to sign the 
magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be called a duplicate 
original warrant and shall be deemed a warrant for purposes of this chap-
ter. In such cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an original war-
rant. The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the duplicate 
original warrant on the face of the original warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original warrant 
shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate shall 
require the person who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the 
grounds for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a search war-
rant. 
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Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney ;—; 
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IN THb FIF'IH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATL OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
CHARLES LANGDON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
1 District Court No. 1187 
Tnis matter cane on before tne Court for decision on tne 
17th day of May, 1988, on the Defendants Motion to Suppress. 
Tne Court received and reviewed the briefs filed by the parties 
and considered the proofs and arguments offered. 
The Court finds the facts to be as follows: 
Three Utah Highway Patrol troopers were en route tro.r, 
St. George to Cedar City on March 17, 1988, at about 1830 nours 
(6:30 p.m.). The driving trooper noted two cars approaching from 
behind travelling extremely fast. Tne cars appeared to the 
troopers to be travelling together. As the troopers approacned 
the middle interchange in Cedar City, they pulled off to the side 
of the interstate and clocked the two vehicles by use of tneir 
radar equipment. The Defendant's vehicle was the second of tne 
two cars and was travelling a little faster than the first. It 
was clocked at 71 miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour zone. 
Tne troopers stopped the car. 
Tne Defendant produced his identification and the vehicle's 
r e g i s t r a t i o n . The car w a s not r e g i s t e r e d to the 
Defendant/driver. Tne trooper became suspicious that the car 
might have been stolen because it was not registered to the 
Defendant/driver and contained very little personal effects in 
the car, a road atlas, and bedding. 
The trooper asked about ownership of the vehicle and a 
telephone number to call to verify ownership or lawful possession 
of the vehicle. While the dispatcner attempted to call tne 
purported owner in California, Trooper Lee inquired of the 
Defendant/driver to search the car for weapons or contraband. 
The Defendant freely consented. His reply was, ,fl don't care. 
Go ahead." He exited the venicle, too* out the keys from the 
ignition, and went directly to the trunk. Without the trooper 
saying anything, the Defendant/driver opened tne trunk. 
Welded to the frame of the car below the trunk and between 
the rear bumper and the gas tank, in plain view from underneatn 
tne car, was a black box measuring 3M x 3M x 12 M. The box was 
locked by a new silver padlock. There were no signs of dirt, 
grime, or road debris on the box or the lock. They appeared to 
be new and recently affixed to the vehicle. 
Wnile the dispatcher was attempting to contact the purported 
owner of the car. Defendant had told the troopers that he had nad 
the car for about a year but did not know the locked box wos 
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there, nor did he have a key to the lock. None of tne keys on 
rings in Defendant's possession fit the lock (although the key 
was later found in the car's jockey-box). Through a small crack 
in the door of the box, it could be seen that something was 
inside. 
The dispatcher was called by telephone by someone purporting 
to be the registered owner who said that Defendant did have 
permission to have the car, but that he (the purported caller) 
did not know of the existence of the subject box either and, 
therefore, could not consent to its search. 
The dispatcher had then attempted to contact Judge Miller, 
who was tne only magistrate known to be in the area, the others 
naving "been out-of-state. It was Judge Miller's husband's 
birthday and tne dispatcner nad to take some time to locate ner. 
Later she arrived at the Utan Highway Patrol offices and a searcn 
warrant was verbally autnonzed by ner at 2040 hours (8:4l4 p.rr,.), 
although a written warrant was never issued. Thereafter tne 
venicle was moved off of the dark interstate to the lignted 
"sa1ly-port" at the Correctional Facility. A more tnorough 
search ensued and the box was opened. It was found to contain 
cocaine. 
The troopers reasonably believed that the vehicle contained 
contraband, which belief was supported by these articulated facts 
known to tne troopers at tne time of the search: 
1. Tne car was not registered to Defendant; 
2. Tne vehicle contained a little luggage, but 
there was an absence of personal property and clothing 
inconsistent with Defendant's going from California to 
Chicago to look for work, as he had said he was doing; 
3. A road atlas was open on the front seat and 
several cities, including Chicago, were marked, as were 
certain areas near Barstow, California, and netween St. 
George, Utah, and Richfield, Utah; those are areas of 
high enforcement by the highway patrol; 
4. T n e D e f e n d a n t first said that the car 
belonyed to his relatives, and later he said he was 
purcnasing the car from them and nad had its possession 
for one and one-half (1 1/2) years; 
b. Tnere was a 3" x 3" x 12" box welded to the 
rear portion of the frame with a brand new silver 
padlock showing no signs of road dirt, grease, or other 
indicia of naving been tnere but a very short time; 
6. Both the Defendant-driver and the purported 
registered owner denied Knowledge of the existence of 
the box; 
7. T h e c a r w a s an o l d e r m o d e l , y e t in 
exceptionally good physical and mechanical s h a p e , 
generally fitting a pattern of otner vehicles known to 
the troopers to be used for interstate transportation 
of drugs; 
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8. There were open household type "stick-up" 
room deodorizers in the trunk and tool kit; and 
9. Through a small opening in the door of the 
box# it could be seen that something was inside the 
box. 
Therefore, the Court concludes tnat the troopers had 
probable cause to conduct a search. 
Inasmuch as the v e n u l e ' s driver was alerted to the 
troopers' suspicions, tne vehicle was stopped on the highway, 
the vehicle was easily moveable, and the vehicle or its contents 
might never nave been found again, the Court concludes that tne 
troopers' search falls within tne "vehicle exception" to the 
warrant requirements. 
Having so concluded tnat tne troopers had probable cause to 
searcn and that tne searcn was witnin the "vehicle exception" to 
the warrant requirement, the Court need not address the issues 
relating to the Leon exception. 
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this 3 / ^ day of May, 1988. 
^ P H I L I P EtyfS 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff, 
vs. 
CHARLES LANGDON, 
Defendant. 
) 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN, 
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
) Criminal No. 1187 
) 
•A 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA BARGAIN 
I, Charles Langdon, the above-named Defendant, under oath, 
nereoy acknowledge tnat I nave entered a plea of no contest to 
the cnarge of UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE MTH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE contained in the Information on file against 
me in the above-entitled Court, a copy of which I nave received 
and read, and I understand the nature of tne elements of tne 
offense for wmch I am pleading no contest. 1 furtner understand 
the cnarge to wnich this plea of no contest is entered is a 
Second-Degree Felony, and that I am entering such a p i «? H 
voluntarily and of my own free will after conferring with my 
attorney, James L. Shumate, and witn the knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1-Hi 
<h J" 
^ ' 1. I know that I have constitutional riqhts under the 
Constitution of Utan and the United States to plead not guilty 
and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered 
a plea of no contest, or to a trial by the Court should I elect 
to waive a trial by jury. I know I nave a rignt to oe 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by 
James L. Shumate. 
I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court uoon the 
charge, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
me by having them testify in open court in my presence and before 
the Court and jury witn the right to have those witnesses cross-
examined by my attorney. 1 also know that 1 ha%je the right to 
have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify 
in Court upon my benalf and that 1 could, if I elected to do so, 
testify in Court on my own benalf, and tnat if I choose not to do 
so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be neid 
against me if I choose to nave the jury so instructed. 
4 J 
!
^, (r* 3. I know that if 1 were to have a trial that tne State 
must prove each and every element of the crime charged to t;ie 
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; tnat 
1 would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and tnat 
any verdict rendered by a jury, whetner it be that of guilty or 
not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of jurors. 
i 4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of tne 
United States that 1 have a right against self-incrimination or a 
right not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
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that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any 
crime and cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial 
unless 1 choose to do so. 
£,t/>% 5. I know tnat under the Constitutions of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court that I wojld 
have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to tne Supreme 
Court or Utan for review of the trial proceedings and that it I 
could not afford to pay tne costs for such appeal, that tnose 
costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have 
tne assistance of counsel on sucn appeal. 
£ / 6. I Know that if 1 wish to contest tne charge against ne, 
I need only plead wnot guilty" and tne matter will be set for 
trial, it wnich time the State of Utah will have the burden of 
proving eacn element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
tne trial is before a 3ury, tne verdict must be unanimous. I 
Know and understand tnat by entering a plea of no contest, I am 
waiving my constitutional rignts as set out in the precedino 
paragrapns and tnat I am, in ract, fully incriminating myself. 
£ f^ 7. I know that under tne laws of Utan the possible maximum 
sentence th3t can and may be imposed upon my plea of no contest 
to tne charge identified on page one of tnis Statement, and as 
set out in the Information, are as follows: 
(A) iTprisonment in the Utan State Prison of not 
less than one (1) year and not to exceed 
fifteen years; 
(B) And/or fined in any amount not in excess of 
ten tnousand dollars ($10,000.00); 
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I further understand that tne imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that 
if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another 
offense of which I have been convicted or to which 1 have pleaded 
guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive 
sentences being imposed on me. 1 also know that I may be ordered 
by the Court to mdke restitution to any victim or victims of my 
crimes. 
/ ^ 8. 1 know that the fact that I have entered a ple3 of no 
contest does not mean that the Court will not impose eitner a 
fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises nave 
oeen made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I 
plead no contest or tnat it will oe made lighter because or my no 
contest plea. 
^4/<* 9. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead no contest, and no promises, 
except those contained herein, have been made to me. I know tnat 
any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to 
what he or they b e l i e v e the Court may ao witn respect to 
sentencing are not binding on tne Court. 
/* )
 % 10. No promises of any kind have been made to induce me to 
L/# fr * 
plead no contest. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing 
c o n c e s s i o n s or recommendations for probation or suspended 
sentences, including a reduction of the charge for sentencing 
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made or sought by eitner defense counsel or the prosecutor are 
not binding on the Court and may not be approved or followed by 
the Court. 
/^J4 11. I have read this Statement or 1 nave had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I 
am free to change or delete anything contained in this Statement. 
1 do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements 
are correct. 
/' (^ 12. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
13. I am 3 S years of age, I have attended scnool 
tnrougn tne / and I can read and understand the 
Lnglisn language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter tne plea W3s 
rr.ade. I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants. 
£/• 
t 14. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the p r o c e e d i n g s and tne 
consequences of my plea and tree of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily entering my plea. 
9J 15. I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my 
attorney and ask the Court to accept my plea of no contest to the 
charge set forth in this Statement because, in tact, on or about 
c 
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tne 17th day of Marcn, 1988, in Iron County, State of Utan, I 
knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, to 
wit: Cocaine, with the intent to distribute. 
DATLD tnis / day ot *7T^W^ > 198b. 
/#*& A ; ^ 
CHARLES LANGDON y 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OP DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that 1 am the attorney for Cnarles Langdon, tne 
Defendant named aoove, and I know ne has read the Statement, or 
that I nave read it to him; and I discussed it with him and 
believe ne fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best oi my knowledge 
and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated, and tnese, along witn tne other 
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the 
foregoing Statement, are accurate and true. 
-^x 
z> -V (rfbS L. SHUMATE 
attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utan in 
its case against Cnarles Langdon, Defendant,. 1 have reviewed tne 
Statement of the Defendant and find that tne declarations, 
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of 
-6-
the Defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense 
are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercions to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. 
The plea negotiations are fully contained in this Statement or *s 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable 
cause to believe the evidence would support the conviction of the 
Defendant for the offense for whicn tne plea is entered and 
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
Iron County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of 
Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing Certificates 
of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of no contest is 
freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered tnat the 
Defendant's plea of Mno contest" to the charge set forth in the 
foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before ne 
this / — day OC-JL*V^*-~ , 1988. 
G2*s€+— 
Judge 
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